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ABSTRACT
Research has found that teaching people about psychological biases 
can help counteract biased behavior. On the other hand, due to the 
innate need for preservation of a positive self-image, it is likely that 
teaching people about biases they hold, may cause a boomerang 
effect in cases where being associated with a specific bias implies 
negative social connotations. In the three studies below we examine 
situations in which psychological bias implies negatively associated 
behavior, and show that teaching people about bias in those contexts 
can be counterproductive.
Introduction
Past research in behavioral decision-making has long shown that people’s judgments and deci-
sions are often biased or irrational (Kahneman, 2011). This is the case even when these deci-
sions are made by experts (Loschelder, Friese, Schaerer, & Galinsky, 2016; Northcraft & Neale, 
1987), or in cardinal situations such as legal verdicts (Danziger, Levav, & Avnaim-Pesso, 2011; 
Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack, 2006) or presidential elections (Antonakis & Dalgas, 2009; Ballew 
& Todorov, 2007; Todorov, Mandisodza, Goren, & Hall, 2005). Interestingly, one method that 
can be used to counteract such biases is simply raising the awareness of people to the bias and 
teaching them its effects. For example, research has found that simply teaching participants about 
Naïve realism – i.e. the psychological bias that causes people to perceive information that does 
not correspond with their existing perspective as inherently wrong – caused those participants to 
become more open to new and different ideas (Nasie, Bar-Tal, Pliskin, Nahhas, & Halperin, 2014).
On the other hand, research on the psychology of self-affirmation suggests that using the 
above debiasing technique may cause a boomerang effect in cases where being associated 
with the specific bias that a person allegedly holds also implies negative social connota-
tions (Schumann & Dweck, 2014; Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Steele, 1988). Moreover, the 
work done in the field of commitment and post hoc justification has found that negative 
consequences of an action can increase the likelihood that a person will justify it and resist 
change (Axsom & Cooper, 1985; Frenkel & Doob, 1976; Kiesler,1971). Both of these fields 
of research can be seen as derived from the cognitive dissonance theory in that when an 
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individual is faced with information that does not coincide with his world view (i.e. positive 
self-image), he is likely to find a way to discredit the new information in the attempt resolve 
the dissonance that is created by the said information (Festinger, 1962).
Accordingly, it is possible that an attempt to change peoples’ biased behavior in a man-
ner that threatens their self-image, or challenges their world view will result in a negative 
boomerang effect. This boomerang effect may also result in entrenchment, that is, not 
only that they will not change their judgments or behavior, but they will even fortify their 
existing opinions. Think, for example, of a moderate conservatives during the 2016 presi-
dential elections campaign who are considering to vote for Trump. Once they are exposed 
to information regarding racist and misogynistic biases that may be affecting Trump sup-
porters, are they likely to accept the fact that they too might be affected by those biases, and 
reconsider their political behavior, or are they more likely to backlash after being implicitly 
(or explicitly) accused of being misogynistic racists? If the latter option takes place, it is also 
likely to assume that this backlash will cause them to be more inclined to justify their actions 
using other explanations, and in turn reinforce their original judgment and behavior. Thus, 
building on existing research, we suggest that before moving on with the development of 
psychological interventions that are based on exposure to psychological bias, it is impor-
tant to examine this possible boomerang effect. Additionally, the examination of peoples’ 
reaction to information regarding psychologically biased behavior can add an unexplored 
domain to the commitment and post hoc justification fields of research.
When considering the conditions under which exposure to psychological bias might 
backlash there are two main factors that need to be considered. First, the bias itself can have 
inherent negative association. For example a bias against powerful women can be considered 
a socially problematic trait by society due to its inherent chauvinistic nature. On the other 
hand, a bias related to inaccuracy in judging character based on specific traits does not 
necessarily have a negative social connotation. The second factor to take into consideration 
in terms of the boomerang effect is the social context in which the bias is described. For 
example, a bias that makes you prefer one White male over another White male might lead 
to inaccuracy, but does not have any negative social connotations. On the other hand, the 
same bias that will make you prefer a male over a female might be perceived as deplorable, 
as a result of the misogynistic outcome. What we are suggesting here can be seen as a 2×2 
matrix in which if the bias does not have inherent socially sensitive nature, and the context 
is not socially sensitive then exposure to the existence of the bias is likely to have the pos-
itive effect described in the literature (Nasie et al., 2014). However, if the bias is inherently 
socially sensitive, or presented in a socially sensitive context (or both) it is likely to expect 
a negative boomerang reaction to the accusation of being biased (see Table 1).
Table 1. Possible combinations of bias nature and bias context. We hypothesize that only combination 
#1 will enable reducing the bias by raising the awareness to it.
  Inherently neutral bias Inherently sensitive bias
neutral social context exposure to the bias diminishes the impact 
of the bias (#1)
exposure to the bias causes boomerang 
effect and increases the impact of the 
bias (#2)
Sensitive social context exposure to the bias causes boomerang 
effect and increases the impact of the 
bias (#3)
exposure to the bias causes boomerang 
effect and increases the impact of the 
bias (#4)
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Based on this 2×2 matrix we designed a pilot and three experimental studies that examine 
the different possible combinations. In the pilot study we tested several different biases and 
contexts to make sure that they are indeed perceived as socially sensitive by participants. 
In study 1 we replicated the results of Nasie et al. (2014), and demonstrated how teaching 
people about a neutral bias that might be relevant to their behavior in a neutral context 
changed their behavior and reduced the bias (combination #1). In Study 2 we taught decision 
makers about an inherently sensitive bias that may imply they were holding chauvinistic 
views in a sensitive social context, of female representation in politics (combination #4). 
Finally, to test if a sensitive social context is enough to evoke the boomerang effect even 
toward a neutral bias, in Study 3 we taught decision makers about a neutral bias in a sen-
sitive social context of a gender in the work place (combination #3). In Studies 2 & 3, we 
hypothesized that the boomerang effect predicted by self-affirmation literature (Schumann 
& Dweck, 2014; Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Steele, 1988) would be a result of participants 
being motivated to justify their actions and stay set in their ways in order to avoid being 
labeled as chauvinistic or misogynistic. Since inherently sensitive biases are always linked 
to sensitive social contexts combination #2 was covered by Study 2 as well, and did not call 
for another Study.
Pilot study
In order to verify the social sensitivity of the biases and context we were going to examine 
in the experimental studies we ran a pilot study in which we asked participants to assess the 
perceived social sensitivity of different biases and different contexts on a scale from 1 to 10. 
We recruited 153 participants via Mturk (92 male; Mage = 35.04 years, SD = 9.9). The biases 
we examined were: 1. The ‘powerful women bias’ in which powerful women are perceived 
in a negative light and judged more harshly than men performing in the same manner. We 
expected this bias to be perceived as inherently socially sensitive due to its chauvinistic 
nature. 2. The ‘Halo effect bias’ in which a specific evaluation of an individual influences 
evaluations of other attributes of that person. We expected this bias to be perceived as 
inherently socially neutral. 3. The ‘track 1 track 2 bias’ in which people make decisions in 
a quick and instinctive manner even when a more analytical approach is preferable. We 
expected this bias to be perceived as inherently socially neutral as well. The two contexts 
we examined were: A context in which two men from the same race and social class are 
competing over a given position as the neutral context, and a context in which a man and 
a woman are competing over a given position as the sensitive context.
As expected the powerful women bias was perceived as significantly more socially sensi-
tive (M = 6.08) than both the Halo effect bias (M = 3.93, t = 8.86, p < .001), and the track 1 
bias (M = 4.43, t = 6.45, p < .001). Additionally, the context in which a man was competing 
with a women was perceived as significantly more sensitive (M = 6.36) than the context in 
which a man was competing with a man (2.96, t = 14.96, p < .001). Moreover, in order to 
verify that we are indeed dealing with biases that are socially sensitive and biases that are 
not, as opposed to biases that are all sensitive just to different degrees we performed a one 
sample t test, and compared the ratings of the different biases and contexts to the mid point 
of the scale (5.5). Once again corroborating our hypothesis, the sensitive bias and context 
were significantly higher than the scale mid point (powerful women bias t = 31.09, p < .001; 
man vs. woman context: t = 29.29, p < .001). On the other hand, the neutral biases and 
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context were significantly lower than the scale mid point (halo effect: t = 17.94, p < .001; 
track 1: t = 20.94, p < .001; man vs. man: t = 11.65, p < .001). These findings verified our 
hypothesis regarding the perceived social sensitivity of the different biases and contexts we 
chose to examine in the following experimental studies.
Study 1
In study 1 we attempted to replicate the results of Nasie et al. (2014) in a scenario in which 
the bias and context at hand are not socially sensitive, and thus raising awareness to the 
bias can reduce its effect. Specifically in Study 1 we focused on political voting behavior, 
and examined if teaching actual voters about a bias, that might be relevant to their voting 
but does not reflect poorly on their self-image, changed their behavior and reduced the 
bias. We ran Study 1 in the context of the 2015 elections in Israel. As we describe below, 
the campaigns during these elections put a significant emphasis on the candidates’ physical 
attributes. This discourse, regarding the physical attributes of both candidates, and their 
relevance to political decision-making, can be explained by the aforementioned research 
on the Halo effect. The Halo effect describes a phenomenon in which a specific evaluation 
of an individual influences evaluations of other attributes of that person (Nisbett & Wilson, 
1977; Thorndike, 1920). This effect has been found to be especially prominent in the case 
of physical attributes and political competence, where rapid judgments about the person-
ality traits of political candidates are made based solely on the physical appearance of the 
said candidates (Todorov et al., 2005; Verhulst, Lodge, & Lavine, 2010; and see Olivola & 
Todorov, 2010 for a review)
In view of that, the following study was an attempt to inform voters about this Halo effect 
bias, in order to raise their awareness, and have them focus on crucial political subjects or 
more relevant leadership characteristics instead of physical appearance. Additionally, since 
the implications of being affected by this specific bias would only cause someone to choose 
one White male candidate over another, being affected by this bias would not entail a racist 
or chauvinistic implication and would therefore not cause a boomerang effect. Accordingly, 
our hypothesis was that similar to the findings of Nasie et al. (2014) mentioned in the 
introduction, it would be enough to simply teach voters about the existence of the Halo 




Eighty-one participants (50 male; Mage = 38.20 years, SD = 13.55) were recruited via an inter-
net survey company, that also ran the election polls for one of the two main news channels in 
Israel (Chanel 10) . The participants, who were randomly selected from a nationwide panel, 
participated in the study and filled out a questionnaire, all on the Qualtrics platform. They 
were randomly assigned to either the control condition or the experimental condition. We 
determined the sample size based on the findings in the Nasie et al. paper (2014) that found 
a medium size effect (d = .46). Accordingly, we ran a power analysis (through G*Power, 
Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) that assumed we wanted to be able to achieve a 
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statistical power of .80 to detect a medium-sized effect (d = .5). This analysis suggested a 
required sample size of 37 participants per condition. The experiment was conducted on 
March 9th 2015 only one week before the elections and in the peak of the electoral process.
Procedure
In the 2015 elections in Israel the incumbent prime minister had a clear advantage over the 
opposition leader. While the prime minister Bejamin Netanyahu was considered to have 
exceptional charisma and an outstanding presence, the opposition leader Isaac Herzog 
was referred to as lacking any charisma due to his high pitched voice, and a feminine 
facial structure (Black, 2015). Indeed, even Herzog’s campaign managers were dragged 
into this debate of their candidate’s problematic physical characteristics and launched a 
campaign in which he appeared with a deep manly voice-over and presented his creden-
tials. At the end of the commercial he then posed a question: ‘After all you’ve heard you’re 
still not going to elect me because of my voice?’ (Jerusalem post, 2015).The participants 
were all given a short article to read. The article was supposedly from the science section 
of a newspaper and described research which found that people have psychological biases 
that cause them to link external attributes, such as facial structure, or height, to leadership 
abilities of congress candidates. The article also stated that this is despite the fact that there 
is no real correlation between these elements. In order to avoid demand characteristics the 
article described a study conducted in the US, and charisma and pitch of voice which were 
the main issues in the Israeli campaign, were not mentioned in the article. In the control 
condition the article was about astronomy. After reading the article and answering a few 
basic comprehension questions, the participants filled out a survey asking them how much 
both leading candidates for prime minister, Netanyahu and Herzog, were fit to be prime 
minister on a scale of 0–100.
Results
As expected, in the control condition Netanyahu, the more charismatic, deep voiced, manly 
candidate, was found to be significantly more fit to be prime minister (M = 65.78, SD = 34.26 
vs. M = 39.87, SD = 34.41), t = 2.74, p = .009, d = .75. On the other hand, in the experimental 
condition where participants were exposed to the information regarding the psychological 
bias of attributing leadership skills to external attributes, the differences between the two 
leaders was almost completely eliminated leaving Netanyahu with a negligible advantage 
(M = 52.19, SD = 32.04) over Herzog (M = 47.39, SD = 32.05), t = .51, p = .61, d = .15, see 
Figure 1.
These results verified our hypothesis by both diminishing the charismatic leader’s status 
as well as enhancing the less charismatic opponent’s status. Interestingly, a deeper analysis 
of the results found that most of the change in the perception of the candidates probably 
stemmed from the participants who displayed the more extreme positions to begin with. We 
used chi-square tests to analyze the proportions of participants who rated either Netanyahu 
or Herzog less than 5 or more than 95 in each of the two experimental conditions. Our 
results indicated that while in the control condition 29% of the participants extremely 
favored Netanyahu, after being exposed to the existence of the psychological bias in the 
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experimental condition, only 8% of participants showed such extreme favoritism: X2 (2, 
N = 81) = 5.33, p < .05. We did not find similar effects in the three other categories.
Discussion
As expected, the results of Study 1 replicated the findings of Nasie et al. (2014), and raising 
the awareness of the participants to the psychological bias that was affecting their political 
judgment led to a de-biasing process that diminished the support for the physically superior 
candidate, and enhanced the support for the physically inferior candidate. Additionally, the 
replication of this effect in a real world political context increased the external validity of 
these findings. However, based on the hypothesis presented in the introduction, we assumed 
that the successful de-biasing occurred due to the fact that there were no negative social 
implications for being influenced by the Halo effect. On the other hand, when dealing with 
a socially sensitive bias or context, a boomerang effect may take place in which not only 
does the awareness to an alleged bias not reduce that bias but it even enforces it, as a result 
of people trying to maintain a positive self-image in light of prejudice accusations. In Study 
2 we tested this possible boomerang effect in the context of male chauvinism with a socially 
sensitive bias in a socially sensitive context.
Study 2
In order to test the effects of bias awareness raising efforts with a socially sensitive bias in a 
socially sensitive context, we replicated the design of Study 1 only this time we chose a bias 
that may entail a socially negative connotation, namely: chauvinism in the socially sensitive 
context of female representation in politics. In Study 2 instead of asking about the how fit 
the party leaders were for the prime minister position, we asked about the fitness of the 
political parties themselves to lead the government taking onto consideration that there 
was a significant gender difference between the two parties. The two leading parties in the 
said elections were the Likud party, and the Labor party. While the Likud party only had 1 
woman in the top 10 party candidates, the Labor party had 4 women in the party’s top 10, 
Figure 1. Difference between candidates in control condition vs. learning about bias condition.
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and also ran on a feminist and gender equality platform. Accordingly, the bias we chose to 
raise awareness to was the powerful women bias in which women who behave confidently 
and assertively are not as well received as men who engage in the same behaviors (Rudman, 
1998). We hypothesized that raised bias awareness would cause a boomerang effect with 
male voters. That is, men, who are at risk of being perceived as chauvinists if they harbor 
such a bias, would not react positively to the bias awareness and perhaps even backlash. 
On the other hand, women are less at risk of being perceived as misogynist thanks to being 
women (indeed, research has found that people are less affected by derogatory labels used 
by their group to describe their group, Carnaghi & Maass, 2007). Accordingly, we also 
hypothesize that raised bias awareness should have a positive effect on women and promote 
more egalitarian behavior among them similar to the findings in Study 1.
Method
Participants and design
One hundred and eleven participants (62 male; Mage  =  40.77  years, SD  =  14.91) were 
recruited via the same internet survey company as in Study 1. The participants, who were 
randomly selected from a nationwide panel, participated in the study and filled out a ques-
tionnaire, all on the Qualtrics platform. They were randomly assigned to either the control 
condition or the experimental condition. We based our decision to determine the sample 
size on a power analysis (through G*Power, Faul et al., 2007) that assumed we wanted to 
be able to achieve a statistical power of .80 to detect a medium-sized effect (d = .5) but this 
time with four groups due to the expected gender moderation. This analysis suggested a 
required sample size of 54 participants per condition. This experiment was conducted on 
March 15th 2015 only two days before the elections and in the peak of the electoral process.
Procedure
The participants were all given a short newspaper article to read. The article was supposedly 
from the science section of a newspaper and described research which found that people 
have psychological biases that cause them perceive powerful women in a negative light and 
judge them more harshly than men in the same position performing in the same manner. 
In order to avoid demand characteristics, the article did not directly address the elections or 
the political parties at hand. In the control condition the article was about astronomy. After 
reading the article and answering a few basic comprehension questions, the participants 
filled out a survey asking them how much both leading political parties, Likud and Labor, 
were fit to be in the government on a scale of 0–100.
Results
As expected, men reacted negatively to the allegations of harboring chauvinistic biases and 
in the experimental condition men rated the dominantly male Likud party even higher 
than they did in the control condition (M = 61.72, SD = 33.39 vs. M = 44.84, SD = 34.28), 
t = 1.96, p = .05, d = .50. Additionally, men rated the gender equal Labor party marginally 
lower in the experimental bias awareness condition than they did in the control condition 
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(M = 52.41, SD = 38.23 vs. M = 68.79, SD = 29.13), t = −1.91, p = .06, d = −.48. Moreover, 
when comparing the difference between the two parties in each condition the same pattern 
appears where in the control condition the labor party is rated as more fit to govern than the 
Likud party and in the experimental condition it is revered, and the Likud party is deemed 
more fit to govern (M = 23.93, SD = 54.71 vs. M = −9.31, SD = 63.63), t = −2.21, p = .03, 
d = .56. We did not find any significant differences in term of the female participants in the 
Likud rating (p = .71) the Labor rating (p = .53), or the difference between parties (p = .89) 
see Figure 2.
Discussion
As expected, not only were we not able to replicate the positive effects of raising bias aware-
ness as in Study 1, but male participants in Study 2 that were exposed to information 
regarding a bias than could portray them in a negative social light, reacted ‘negatively’ 
to the bias awareness manipulation. Accordingly, the intervention that was intended to 
promote gender equality ended up harming the political party that ran on gender equality, 
and assisted the party that lacked in this aspect. Nonetheless, study 2 has a few limitations. 
First, despite the fact that the alleged newspaper article did not address political elections 
directly, it did explicitly describe the bias against dominant/successful women. Thus, it is 
possible that this influenced the answers of the participants in the experimental condition. 
Second, it is possible that political affiliation of participants may have played a significant 
role in participants’ response in Studies 1 and 2. Despite the random assignment of partic-
ipants addresses this issue, it is still a variable we cannot completely account for. This issue 
could account for the gender based difference between the control condition and for the 
lack of difference between conditions among female participants. Finally, while running 
the study adjacent to the elections gave the findings of studies 1 and 2 a boost of relevance, 
participants were probably bombarded with political campaigns during the same period 
without our ability to properly control for other political stimuli. Study 3 addressed these 
three main limitations.
Figure 2.  Difference between rating of parties among male participants in the control condition vs. 
learning about bias condition.
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Study 3
Study 3 was designed in a workplace context where political affiliation would not act as a 
confound, and where there is seemingly no explanation for discrimination against women 
other than gender-based bias. As in the previous studies, Study 3 attempted to raise aware-
ness to a bias affecting decision-making and to test whether such raised awareness would 
have a productive or a counterproductive effect in the attempt to reduce biased behavior. 
However, in Study 3 we examined a scenario in which only the context is socially sensi-
tive while the bias itself is neutral in order to examine whether this was enough to induce 
the boomerang effect. Once again, we hypothesized that men – who are at risk of being 
perceived as chauvinists if they harbor a bias that effects their behavior towards women 
– would backlash and react negatively to the bias awareness intervention. One the other 
hand, women that are in less risk of being perceived as misogynists should have a positive 
reaction to the bias awareness intervention, and display more egalitarian behavior in the 
gender context as in Study 2.
Method
Participants and design
One hundred and twenty-one participants (66 male; Mage = 32.54 years, SD = 14.91) were 
recruited via Mturk. The participants, who were randomly selected, participated in the study 
and filled out a questionnaire, all on the Qualtrics platform. They were randomly assigned 
to either the control condition or the experimental condition. The sample size was rationale 
was similar to the one in Study 2.
Procedure
The participants were all given a short newspaper article to read. For the experimental group, 
the article was supposedly from the science section of a newspaper and described research 
regarding decision-making. In order to avoid demand characteristics, the article did not 
directly address gender but instead described research which found that people have two 
possible decision-making processes: track 1 and track 2. While track 1 is more fast and intu-
itive, track 2 is more analytical and information based. Although track 1 is more instinctive, 
it is prone to mistakes and exposed to biases and therefore it is advised to try and be more 
analytical and patient when in decision-making processes in order to avoid biased decisions. 
Thus, participants who may negatively biased against women were not explicitly accused of 
that. Rather, the text implied that they use track 1 in their judgements and consequently may 
judge women more harshly. In the control condition participants read an article about Zebras.
After reading the article and answering a few basic comprehension questions, the par-
ticipants were told that Mturk is considering the employment of an Mturk worker to act 
as workers’ representative and manage worker rights issues etc. It said that there were two 
possible candidates for the job, and Mturk would like to get the workers opinion on them 
based on their bio. The structure of the two bios was identical and consisted of personal 
information, education and grades, and past experience, as well as some neutral filler infor-
mation. The main difference between the bios was that one was a bio of a man – Kevin, and 
the other was the bio of a woman – Natalie.
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To control for physical attractiveness (Mobius & Rosenblat, 2006) and other facial char-
acteristics that may influence participants’ judgements (Todorov, Said, Engell, & Oosterhof, 
2008), we used the faces by Gladstone and O’Connor (2014), used a computer program to 
create similar faces of a man and a woman (see Figure 3).
Importantly, and to counter the possible alternative explanation that Kevin was a better 
candidate for the job, Natalie was a better fit for the job on almost every front. After reading 
the bios participants were asked to rate the extent to which they felt each candidate was 
fit for the job (job-fit) and the extent to which they felt the participants had the necessary 
skills for the job (job-skills) on a scale of 0–100.
Results
The two above variables (job-fit and job-skills) were integrated to a single grade (Kevin: 
r = .81, p < .001; Natalie: r = .69, p < .001). To examine our hypothesis that gender would 
moderate the reaction to the bias awareness manipulation, we ran a moderation analysis 
(using Preacher and Hayes’ PROCESS macro, model 1; Hayes, 2013) on the rating of the 
candidates, considering participants condition (with/without bias awareness), and partici-
pants’ gender as independent variables. As expected, the analysis yielded a significant two-
way interaction between the bias awareness manipulation and gender, b = 11.29, SE = 5.94, 
t = 1.90, p = .06. Although not surprisingly all participant rated the far superior Natalie 
more positively than Kevin (based on the given information), among female participants 
the difference between Natalie and Kevin’s rating in the control condition was only 6.65 
(SD = 14.47), however, in the bias awareness condition it grew to 11.55 (SD = 12.21) in 
Natalie’s favor (p = .18, d = .37). On the other hand, the male participants showed the exact 
opposite trend and although they favored Natalie by 12.50 points (SD = 17.65) in the con-
trol condition, after being exposed to their possible bias the difference between Natalie and 
Kevin Shrunk to 6.10 points (SD = 17.14) (p = .16, d = .37) See Figure 4.
Figure 3. The similar faces of Kevin and natalie. Source: Gladstone and o’connor (2014).
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Discussion
Study 3 replicated the results of Study 2 even without explicitly arising awareness to the 
sensitive social topic, and this time in a more controlled environment without any political 
ideology confound. As in Study 2, the results of Study 3 show that participants exposed 
to a psychological bias they may hold, which suggested negative social connotations such 
as chauvinism reacted in a reverse way: increasing rather than decreasing their biased 
judgments.
Conclusion
While previous work done by Nasie et al. (2014), which has also been replicated in Study 1 
above, has shown that teaching people about psychological bias can help counteract this bias, 
in the current article we offer a more complex process. Based on the finding in Studies 2 and 
3, it seems that in situations where being affected by psychological bias can entail negative 
social branding such as racism or chauvinism, people taught about that psychological bias 
might actually react in the opposite manner than expected and become more entrenched 
in their biased behavior. Additionally, based on the findings from Study 3 it is apparent that 
if the context is socially sensitive then raising awareness to psychological bias can backfire 
even when the bias at hand is neutral in nature.
Returning to the 2016 US elections example, we suggest that the above mechanism might 
have been at work there too. If the democrats thought that many American voters were 
over- focusing on the private email-server issue, thus suffering from the prominence effect 
(Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988), raising their awareness to this bias might have worked 
as a de-biasing tool (Nasie et al., 2014). But not only that the democrats did not use this 
technique, but they kept stressing the alleged chauvinistic or racist agenda of their adversary, 
thus implicitly accusing potential Trump voters of holding such socially negative opinions, 
and possibly making them even more set in their ways.
Figure 4. Difference in favor of the more suitable female candidate in the control condition vs. learning 
about bias condition.
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While studies 2 and 3 supported our hypothesis, the underlying mechanism at hand 
still needs to be brought to light. Based on the self-affirmation literature (Schumann & 
Dweck, 2014; Sherman & Cohen, 2006; Steele, 1988), we assume that in order to maintain 
a positive self-image, people exposed to information regarding their own biased behavior 
might be motivated to justify their actions in alternate ways and as a result also fortify their 
existing biased behavior. Future studies should try and examine this issue, and flesh out 
the underlying mechanism.
In sum, although teaching people about their psychological bias can be beneficial in 
counteracting biased behavior, it seems that it can also backfire under certain circumstance. 
To this end, we tried to provide an initial framework for a more complex approach to psy-
chological bias information as a social intervention in the attempts to devise a positive and 
useful socio-psychological intervention.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
References
Antonakis, J., & Dalgas, O. (2009). Predicting elections: Child’s play! Science, 323(5918), 1183–1183.
Axsom, D., & Cooper, J. (1985). Cognitive dissonance and psychotherapy: The role of effort justification 
in inducing weight loss. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 21(2), 149–160.
Ballew, C. C., & Todorov, A. (2007). Predicting political elections from rapid and unreflective face 
judgments. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104(46), 17948–17953.
Black, I. (2015). Isaac Herzog, scion of Israeli political dynasty, battling to dislodge Netanyahu. The 
Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/17/isaac-yitzhak-herzog-profile-israeli-
political-dynasty-zionist-union
Carnaghi, A., & Maass, A. (2007). In-group and out-group perspectives in the use of derogatory 
group labels: Gay versus fag. Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 26(2), 142–156. Chicago.
Danziger, S., Levav, J., & Avnaim-Pesso, L. (2011). Extraneous factors in judicial decisions. Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences, 108(17), 6889–6892.
Englich, B., Mussweiler, T., & Strack, F. (2006). Playing dice with criminal sentences: The influence of 
irrelevant anchors on experts’ judicial decision making. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
32(2), 188–200.
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A.-G., & Buchner, A. (2007). G*Power 3: A flexible statistical power 
analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences. Behavior Research Methods, 
39, 175–191.
Festinger, L. (1962). Cognitive dissonance. Scientific American., 207(4), 93–106.
Frenkel, O. J., & Doob, A. N. (1976). Post-decision dissonance at the polling booth. Canadian Journal 
of Behavioral Science, 8(4), 347.
Garramone, G. M. (1985). Effects of negative political advertising: The roles of sponsor and rebuttal. 
Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 29(2), 147–159.
Gladstone, E., & O’Connor, K. M. (2014). A counterpart’s feminine face signals cooperativeness and 
encourages negotiators to compete. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 125, 
18–25.
Hayes, A. F. (2013). Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis: A 
regression-based approach. Guilford Press.
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Kiesler, C. A. (1971). The psychology of commitment: Experiments linking behavior to belief. San Diego, 
CA: Academic Press.
SOCIAL INFLUENCE  51
Loschelder, D. D., Friese, M., Schaerer, M., & Galinsky, A. D. (2016). The too-much-precision effect: 
when and why precise anchors backfire with experts. Psychological science, 27(12), 1573–1587.
Mobius, M. M., & Rosenblat, T. S. (2006). Why beauty matters. The American Economic Review, 
96(1), 222–235.
Nasie, M., Bar-Tal, D., Pliskin, R., Nahhas, E., & Halperin, E. (2014). Overcoming the barrier of 
narrative adherence in conflicts through awareness of the psychological bias of naive realism. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 0146167214551153.
Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). The halo effect: Evidence for unconscious alteration of 
judgments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35(4), 250.
Northcraft, G. B., & Neale, M. A. (1987). Experts, amateurs, and real estate: An anchoring-and-
adjustment perspective on property pricing decisions. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 39(1), 84–97.
Olivola, C. Y., & Todorov, A. (2010). Elected in 100 ms: Appearance-based trait inferences and voting. 
Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 34(2), 83–110.
Rudman, L. A. (1998). Self-promotion as a risk factor for women: The costs and benefits of 
counterstereotypical impression management. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74(3), 
629.
Schumann, K., & Dweck, C. S. (2014). Who accepts responsibility for their transgressions? Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 0146167214552789
Sherman, D. K., & Cohen, G. L. (2006). The psychology of self-defense: Self-affirmation theory. 
Advances in experimental social psychology, 38, 183–242.
Steele, C. M. (1988). The psychology of self-affirmation: Sustaining the integrity of the self. Advances 
in experimental social psychology, 21, 261–302.
The Jerusalem Post staff. (2015). Herzog’s new ad chides voters unsure of his voice. The Jerusalem Post. 
http://www.jpost.com/Israel-Elections/Watch-Herzogs-new-dubbed-ad-chides-voters-unsure-of-
his-voice-391271
Thorndike, E. L. (1920). A constant error in psychological ratings. Journal of Applied Psychology, 
4(1), 25–29.
Todorov, A., Mandisodza, A. N., Goren, A., & Hall, C. C. (2005). Inferences of competence from 
faces predict election outcomes. Science, 308(5728), 1623–1626.
Todorov, A., Said, C. P., Engell, A. D., & Oosterhof, N. N. (2008). Understanding evaluation of faces 
on social dimensions. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12(12), 455–460.
Tversky, A., Sattath, S., & Slovic, P. (1988). Contingent weighting in judgment and choice. Psychological 
review, 95(3), 371.
Verhulst, B., Lodge, M., & Lavine, H. (2010). The attractiveness halo: Why some candidates are 
perceived more favorably than others. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 34(2), 111–117.
